



HFS²⁰²⁴ MUN

THE XIII SESSION



UNSC

United Nations
Security Council



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Letter from the Executive Board

Welcome to the United Nations Security Council.

The Executive Board welcomes each one of you to the Hiranandani Foundation School Model United Nations' United Nations Security Council committee.

The subject matter is bound to evoke strong emotions rather than relying solely on logical reasoning, and the committee members contribute further to this lively discussion with their well-researched insights and passionate arguments, guaranteeing an exciting exchange of ideas. We're standing at a pivotal juncture where the stakes have surged to unparalleled levels. It's a moment of great significance and gravity, unlike anything we've ever encountered. For many, it may be the first-ever MUN conference in your educational experience, and we strongly encourage you to go through the study guide that has been prepared for you as a part of the conference to get an in-depth understanding of the issues that will be discussed in committee. However, there is a lot of content available beyond the study guides. Delegates are urged to run external research in order to be holistically well versed with not just the agenda at hand, but also parallel political issues and individual histories and knowledge of provided portfolios. You are expected to research, collate, list down possible points of discussion, questions, and plausible responses and be prepared to enjoy the intellectual energy in the room. At the same time it is not only about speaking and presenting but also the ability to listen, understand viewpoints and learn from each one's perspective.

The UNSC is a technical committee that has a strong focus on multilateralism and the ability to create solutions that benefit not only a political party, but all parties involved. The issue being discussed in the committee requires a balance of all traits to ensure the best results. Remember that you can be a powerful delegate and still be diplomatic and respectful of your fellow delegates. The executive board strongly encourages all delegates to actively participate in the committee regardless of their experience, and engage in debate. We, the executive board, ensure a thrilling experience and wish all our enthusiastic delegates the very best!

Regards,
The Executive Board,
United Nations Security Council.

Shanay Shukla - Director
Teesta Bhattacharya - Director
Varun Sinha - Assistant Director


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Agenda

Genocide and
geopolitics; the
crisis in Darfur and
its global
Implications





Key Terms

Janjaweed: A militia group accused of committing widespread atrocities in Darfur, including ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA): A peace deal signed in 2005 between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), addressing broader Sudanese conflicts but impacting the Darfur situation.

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A): One of the major rebel factions fighting against the Sudanese government in Darfur.

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM): Another key rebel group involved in the conflict, known for its political and military campaigns against the Sudanese government.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): Individuals who are forced to flee their homes but remain within their country's borders, a significant issue in Darfur.

African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID): A joint peacekeeping mission established by the African Union and the United Nations to address the security situation in Darfur.

International Criminal Court (ICC): An international tribunal that has issued arrest warrants for Sudanese officials, including former President Omar al-Bashir, for crimes committed in Darfur.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P): A global political commitment to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, relevant to the international response to Darfur.

Ceasefire Agreement: An agreement between warring parties to stop hostilities, often a critical step towards peace negotiations in Darfur.

Genocide: The deliberate and systematic destruction of an ethnic, racial, or religious group, a term frequently used to describe the atrocities in Darfur.



Humanitarian Access: The ability of humanitarian organisations to reach affected populations with aid, often restricted in Darfur due to security concerns.

Sanctions: Economic and political penalties imposed by the international community to pressure the Sudanese government and rebel factions to cease hostilities.

Peacekeeping Mandate: The official authorization given to peacekeeping forces, outlining their objectives and rules of engagement in Darfur.

Human Rights Violations: Breaches of fundamental rights and freedoms, extensively documented in Darfur, including mass killings, rape, and displacement.

Reconciliation Commission: A proposed body to facilitate peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts between different ethnic and political groups in Darfur.

Negotiation Track: The specific pathway or forum used for peace talks between the Sudanese government and Darfur rebel groups.

Protection of Civilians (POC): A primary objective of UNAMID, focusing on safeguarding civilians from violence and human rights abuses.

Security Council Resolution: A formal decision or statement adopted by the UNSC, directing international action on the Darfur conflict.

Mediation: The process of intervening in a dispute to help parties reach a voluntary agreement, crucial in Darfur peace efforts.

Conflict Resolution Mechanism: Structures and processes designed to address and resolve the underlying causes of the Darfur conflict.

Diplomatic Immunity: Legal protection granted to diplomats, sometimes a contentious issue in prosecuting those responsible for crimes in Darfur.

Transitional Justice: Measures to address past human rights violations and ensure accountability, including tribunals and truth commissions in the Darfur context.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): A process to disarm combatants, disband armed groups, and reintegrate them into society, essential for lasting peace in Darfur.

Peacebuilding: Activities aimed at creating the conditions for sustainable peace by addressing root causes of conflict and supporting societal recovery.

War Crimes: Serious violations of the laws and customs of war, including those committed by all parties in the Darfur conflict.



Research & Preparation

Delegate research and preparation is a critical element of attending HFS MUN and enjoying the debate experience. We have provided this Study Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in your committee. We encourage and expect each of you to critically explore the selected topics and be able to identify and analyse their intricacies upon arrival at HFS MUN. To accurately represent a country, delegates must be able to articulate its policies. Accordingly, UNSC at HFS MUN requires each delegate to submit a position paper on the committee's agenda.

The UNSC Position Papers should be structured into three sections:

I: Topic Background – This section should describe the history of the topic as it would be described by the delegate's country. Delegates do not need to give an exhaustive account of the topic, but rather focus on the details that are most important to the delegation's policy and proposed solutions.

II: Country Policy – This section should discuss the delegation's policy regarding the topic. Each paper should state the policy in plain terms and include the relevant statements, statistics, and research that support the effectiveness of the policy. Comparisons with other global issues are also appropriate here.

III. Proposed Solutions – This section should detail the delegation's proposed solutions to address the topic. Descriptions of each solution should be thorough. Each idea should clearly connect to the specific problem it aims to solve and identify potential obstacles to implementation and how they can be avoided. The solution should be a natural extension of the country's policy.

Each topic's position paper should be no more than 3 pages long 1.5-spaced with Times New Roman size 12. The paper must be written from the perspective of your assigned country and should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference.



Introduction to the Committee


UNSC is one of the principal organs of the UN. While, its powers as outlined in the United Nations Charter include establishing peacekeeping operations, enacting international sanctions, and authorising military action.

The Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions (to be precise, any and all resolutions passed under CHAPTER VII of the UN CHARTER are legally binding in nature) having special powers but with complicated power structures, UNSC is composed of 15 member states (5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members). While, Permanent members are the US, UK, PRC, FRANCE, RUSSIA, having special privilege of casting a negative vote in order to block any resolution of substantial matter in the council (THE VETO POWER), and the non-permanent members are elected for a term of 2 years on the rotational basis and the representation is based on the premise of the regional representation of the states. The meetings of the UNSC are presided over by the PRESIDENT of the COUNCIL which are the member states and the PRESIDENCY is on monthly rotational basis in the ALPHABETICAL ORDER of the members. To highlight, ARTICLE 30 of the UN CHARTER, which enables the president of the security council to adopt its own rules of procedure and as a matter of fact the provisional rules of procedure of the SECURITY COUNCIL (S/96/Rev.7) Article 29 of the United Nations Charter provides that the Security Council can establish subsidiary bodies in order to perform its functions. The subsidiary bodies established by the Security Council are extremely heterogeneous. On the one hand, they include bodies such as the Security Council Committee on Admission of New Members. On the other hand, both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda were also created as subsidiary bodies of the Security Council. By now, numerous Sanctions Committees have been established in order to oversee implementation of the various sanction's regimes which are also subsidiary bodies of the council.



Under the United Nations Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are:

- to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
- to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;
- to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
- to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;
- to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;
- to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
- to take military action against an aggressor;
- to recommend the admission of new Members;
- to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in "strategic areas";
- to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.





Introduction to the Agenda

According to Article II of the Genocide Convention, genocide can be defined as a crime committed with the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, in whole or in part. We must remember and recognise that there are two aspects to every conflict. Firstly; Internal factors that affect regional geopolitics and economics which include key stakeholders and regional political bodies which can be considered as non-state actors under International Law.

Africa as a continent has had a history of political instability but one must go back in time to understand the nature and form of such conflict.

Firstly Africa's history of slavery is an underlying unifying theme for most if not all States in the continent. Secondly, mass colonisation by European powers has led to radical Non-State Actors (NSAs) to be fluent in not only indigenous languages but also European languages such as Portuguese and French. This allows for NSAs to communicate regionally and intercontinentally with a high degree of efficiency. The situation in Sudan and the Darfur region is highly volatile not only due to the presence of conflicting NSAs but also due to state intervention. The focus of this committee is the following:

- Addressing the rate of Escalation and providing Accountability among other Humanitarian Aid Factors in Darfur;
- Ensuring the Signing of a Peace Treaty between all Armed Groups utilising Pacific Settlement of Disputes as Well as Mediation Techniques that have Worked in Africa in the Past;
- Countering the Threat Posed by Armed Groups in Sudan;
- Upholding International Humanitarian Law in Conflict Zones;
- Promoting International Cooperation and Multilateralism under the Rule of Law.



History of the Agenda

The Conflict in Darfur

The Darfur region in western Sudan became a crucible of violence and suffering in the early 21st century. In 2003, a simmering resentment towards the perceived marginalisation of the non-Arab population by the Sudanese government erupted into an armed insurrection. This rebellion triggered a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. The government strategically armed and empowered Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to quell the rebellion. However, their tactics went far beyond legitimate warfare. The Janjaweed terrorised civilians, systematically targeting non-Arab villages and hindering the delivery of vital humanitarian aid by international organisations. Despite a fragile ceasefire agreement in 2004 and the deployment of African Union troops, the conflict escalated. By 2007, hundreds of thousands had perished, and over two million people were displaced internally or forced to flee Sudan altogether. This devastating humanitarian crisis necessitated a more robust international response.

In July 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorised the creation of a hybrid peacekeeping force, UNAMID, merging the existing AU mission with UN resources. However, deployment faced delays, leaving the region vulnerable. The gravity of the situation was further underscored by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2008. The prosecutor accused Sudanese President Bashir of bearing direct criminal responsibility for the crisis, alleging acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This unprecedented move – seeking an arrest warrant for a sitting head of state – highlighted the international community's growing concern and outrage.

While the Sudanese government vehemently denied the charges, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Bashir in March 2009, albeit for war crimes and crimes against humanity, not genocide. A year later, a further warrant was issued, this time specifically for genocide. These indictments placed immense pressure on the international community to hold Bashir accountable and end the suffering in Darfur.



Elections, Referendum, and Lingering Tensions

Despite the ICC warrant for his arrest, President Bashir's grip on power appeared unshaken in Sudan's 2010 multiparty elections – the first in over two decades. Bashir secured a disputed re-election with a high turnout, while

Salva Kiir, President of the semi-autonomous south, retained his position with an overwhelming majority. However, the withdrawal of key opposition candidates and concerns raised by international observers cast a shadow on the legitimacy of the polls. Meanwhile, the fate of southern Sudan hung in the balance. As per the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), a referendum on independence was held in January 2011. The overwhelming vote for secession nearly 99% – marked a historic turning point. International observers deemed the process credible, paving the way for South Sudan's independence in July 2011. However, the path to separation was far from smooth. Several critical issues remained unresolved, including oil revenue sharing, national debt distribution, and border demarcation. The disputed Abyei region became a flashpoint. Bashir's controversial military intervention in May 2011 displaced tens of thousands and threatened to reignite civil war. Fortunately, a fragile agreement in June established a temporary joint administration and mandated troop withdrawal from both sides, with Ethiopian peacekeepers deployed to maintain stability.

Another conflict erupted in Southern Kordofan, bordering the soon-to-be independent south. This region, home to the Nuba people and former southern allies, held significant oil reserves destined to remain with the north. Clashes erupted in June, with the Sudanese army launching a brutal campaign against suspected rebels. The African Union eventually brokered a ceasefire agreement, addressing the status of northern fighters who sided with the south during the civil war. Despite these last-minute agreements, the spectre of unresolved issues loomed large as South Sudan prepared for independence. The north and south agreed to continue negotiations on oil revenue sharing, border demarcation, and other critical matters following the secession. On July 9, 2011, South Sudan became an independent nation, marking a new chapter in the region's history, but significant challenges remained on the path to lasting peace and stability.

Sudan in the Aftermath of Secession: South Sudan's independence in July 2011 left a gaping hole in Sudan's economy and its territorial integrity. The loss of the south's lucrative oil fields necessitated immediate austerity measures. President Bashir announced a "three-year program" to adjust to this new fiscal reality. Bashir also unveiled a vision for a "second republic," promising transparency, greater political freedoms, and a new constitution. However, these pronouncements were met with scepticism by his opponents who had long challenged his authoritarian rule. Engagement in "active dialogues" to resolve remaining conflicts was another



pillar of Bashir's strategy. The government signed a peace agreement with a minor Darfuri rebel group in July 2011, offering a glimmer of hope. However, a different story unfolded in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. Agreements brokered by the African Union failed to hold, with fighting resuming in July and September respectively.

The economic picture remained bleak. The Central Bank of Sudan rushed the introduction of a new Sudanese pound, just weeks after South Sudan launched its own currency. This "influx of two new currencies within a narrow time frame" raised serious concerns about regional economic instability, especially considering the unresolved issues between the two nations. The future of Sudan remained precarious, burdened by a struggling economy, ongoing conflicts, and a deep sense of distrust.

The Tumultuous Relationship Between Sudan and South Sudan

Despite international mediation efforts, numerous unresolved issues continued to plague the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan after the latter's independence in 2011. A major point of contention was oil revenue sharing. South Sudan pumped oil, but it relied on Sudan's pipelines and infrastructure for export. The disagreement over transit fees escalated in December 2011, leading to Sudan seizing South Sudan's oil as compensation. In retaliation, South Sudan halted oil production in January 2012, seeking alternative export routes. This move resulted in both nations losing a crucial source of income. A glimmer of hope emerged in September 2012 when agreements were reached on oil fees, border demarcation, and other matters. However, implementation remained sluggish due to ongoing disagreements. Finally, in March 2013, both countries recommitted to the agreements with specific timelines, leading to the resumption of oil production and transportation in April.

Unfortunately, tensions escalated on other fronts. Sudanese aerial bombardments began in late 2011, targeting areas near the border claimed by South Sudan as rebel havens. Border skirmishes further strained the relationship. A significant incident occurred in March 2012 over the Heglig region, a disputed oil-rich area claimed by both nations. South Sudan occupied Heglig for a brief period, triggering condemnation from the AU and UN who deemed it illegal. Pressure led to South Sudan's withdrawal, but sporadic clashes continued, along with aerial bombardments by Sudan. The conflict also spilled over into the disputed Abyei region before a fragile ceasefire took hold in May 2013, with both sides withdrawing troops.



Adding fuel to the fire, the Dinka people of Abyei, who aligned with South Sudan, held a unilateral referendum in October 2013, overwhelmingly voting for secession and joining South Sudan. This vote, however, was boycotted by the Misseriya, seasonal residents aligned with Sudan, and received no official recognition from either nation.

Rebellion, Economic Woes, and a Flawed Election in Sudan

Following South Sudan's secession, Sudan grappled with persistent rebel activity in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile. The government's heavy-handed response – deploying airpower, tanks, and advanced weaponry – yielded limited success. Bashir's pledge to quash rebellions by 2015 proved unrealistic, given the rebels' local support and the national army's resource constraints. This ongoing conflict displaced millions – over 650,000 seeking refuge in neighbouring countries and an additional 1.8 million internally displaced within Sudan by the end of 2014. Meanwhile, public discontent with the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) intensified.

Citizens grew weary of the party's policies, the lack of transparency, and a deteriorating economy marked by rising inflation and a plummeting Sudanese pound. Cuts to fuel and other subsidies triggered anti-government protests, with some demanding regime change. In 2012, student-led protests in Khartoum escalated into clashes with police, and the following year, nationwide unrest erupted, marking the worst such episode since the 1985 coup. The government responded harshly, arresting hundreds, and employing brutal tactics to silence media coverage.

Despite having initially promised to step down, Bashir reneged on his word in October 2014, accepting the NCP's nomination for the 2015 presidential elections. In a temporary reprieve, the ICC suspended its investigation against him in December 2014 due to the UN Security Council's inaction. Opposition groups called for a delay in the 2015 elections, citing unresolved issues like rebel activity and the need for constitutional reform.

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Popular Uprising Ends Bashir's Reign

The year 2018 marked a turning point in Sudan's recent history. A crippling economic crisis, characterised by soaring prices, shortages of essential goods, and looming subsidy cuts spurred by the IMF, ignited public anger. In December, Sudanese citizens took to the streets in large-scale protests. Initially focused on bread and necessities, the demonstrations swiftly morphed into a powerful anti-government movement demanding Bashir's resignation. The simmering discontent with Bashir's decades-long rule erupted violently in Atbara, where protestors set fire to the local NCP headquarters. Similar scenes unfolded in other cities, with clashes erupting between demonstrators and security forces. Despite a defiant rally in January 2019, where Bashir vowed to cling to power until voted out, the tide had turned against him.

Desperate to quell the escalating protests, Bashir declared a state of emergency in February. He dissolved governments at both national and state levels, appointed military officials as governors, and introduced a new Prime Minister. He further attempted to appease public anger by stepping down as head of the NCP, reshuffling his cabinet, and promising reforms and dialogue with the opposition.

However, these manoeuvres failed to quell the growing demand for his removal. On April 6, coinciding with the anniversary of the 1985 uprising that toppled Nimeiri, a massive protest converged on the military headquarters in Khartoum. This pivotal event witnessed a significant shift – elements of the military itself began to shield the protestors, revealing a widening rift within the armed forces regarding loyalty to Bashir's regime. The historic sit-in that ensued continued for days, a testament to the unwavering resolve of the Sudanese people.

The inevitable finally transpired on April 11, 2019. In a bloodless military coup, Bashir was ousted from power and arrested. The military announced the dissolution of the government, suspension of the constitution, and the formation of a transitional military council to oversee a two-year period before elections for a new civilian government. While jubilant over Bashir's removal, the protestors remained sceptical of the military's plans. Their continued sit-in underscored their unwavering demand – a civilian-led transitional government to usher in a new era of democracy in Sudan.

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Sudan's Turbulent Transition

The euphoria following Bashir's ouster in April 2019 quickly gave way to the complexities of navigating a transition to civilian rule. Talks between civilian groups and the military, now in control through a transitional council, were fraught with challenges. Periods of progress were punctuated by impasses over the composition of a new government. Demonstrations and strikes continued, aimed at maintaining pressure for a genuine civilian-led transition.

The military's response to protests was often heavy-handed, tragically culminating in the "June 3 massacre" where security forces cleared a major protest site in Khartoum, resulting in over 100 deaths. This atrocity led to the African Union suspending Sudan's membership. Undeterred, mediation efforts spearheaded by Ethiopia and the AU persevered. Finally, in August 2019, a breakthrough arrived with the signing of the "constitutional declaration," a power-sharing agreement between the civilian alliance, Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), and the military.

A power-sharing body, the Sovereign Council, composed of both military and civilian representatives, assumed power on August 21, 2019. This council was tasked with governing until democratic elections in 2022. The agreement stipulated a rotational leadership structure, with a military officer heading the council for the first 21 months, followed by a civilian leader. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who led the initial military council, became the first president of the Sovereign Council. Abdalla Hamdok, chosen by the FFC, was appointed Prime Minister and formed a cabinet. With a civilian-led government seemingly in place, the African Union lifted its suspension of Sudan. Meanwhile, Bashir faced corruption charges and was convicted in December 2019. However, more serious charges related to the deaths of protestors awaited trial.

Sudan's path to democracy remained precarious. The power-sharing arrangement, though a significant achievement, was inherently fragile. The 2022 elections loomed as a critical test, but deep-seated tensions and lingering mistrust between the military and civilian actors threatened to derail the fragile peace process.

Timeline of Key Events

2003

February: Two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), rise in western Darfur, accusing the Khartoum government of neglecting the arid region and arming Arab militias against civilians.

2004

January: The Sudanese army launches a brutal campaign to quell the rebellion, displacing hundreds of thousands of Darfuri civilians who flee to neighbouring Chad.

March: The UN raises alarm, accusing pro-government Janjaweed militias of carrying out systematic killings of African villagers.

April: A fragile ceasefire is brokered between the government, SLA, and JEM.

September: The UN criticises Sudan's lack of progress in disarming militias and urges acceptance of international intervention to protect civilians. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell calls the atrocities in Darfur "genocide."

2005

January: While a UN report acknowledges systematic abuses, it avoids labeling the violence as genocide.

March: The UN Security Council imposes sanctions for ceasefire violations and authorizes referral of war crimes suspects to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

2006

May: The government signs a peace accord with a faction of the SLA, but the deal is rejected by other rebel groups.

August-September: Sudan fiercely resists the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, fearing a compromise of national sovereignty. International pressure mounts as fears of a full-blown war escalate.

October: The UN's top official in Sudan is expelled by the government.

November: The African Union extends its peacekeeping mission in Darfur.

December: Sudan reluctantly agrees to accept UN troops as part of a hybrid peacekeeping force.

2007

February: The ICC names the first two war crimes suspects in Darfur, prompting outrage from the Sudanese government.

May: The US imposes additional sanctions and pushes for an international arms embargo to stop the "genocide."

August: The UN Security Council authorises a robust hybrid force of 26,000 troops and police for Darfur, with the mandate to use force for civilian protection.

2008

October: Government declares a ceasefire and peace talks open in Libya, but key rebel groups are absent.

May: JEM rebels launch a surprise attack near Khartoum, highlighting the ongoing instability.

July: The ICC prosecutor requests an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

October: Facing international pressure, al-Bashir pledges cooperation with the peacekeeping force and promises increased spending on development in Darfur. The UN estimates staggering death tolls and displacements.

November-December: While al-Bashir announces another ceasefire, sceptical rebels continue fighting and the government bolsters its troop presence in Darfur. A report by African charities exposes the horrific practice of slavery against non-Arab civilians.

2009

February: Government forces capture a town in Darfur after clashes with JEM. Meanwhile, peace talks in Qatar offer a glimmer of hope.

March: The ICC issues a landmark arrest warrant for al-Bashir, the first for a sitting head of state. The Sudanese government retaliates by expelling international aid organisations accused of collaborating with the ICC. Peace talks collapse following this move.

2010

February: The ICC appeals chamber urges reconsideration of the omission of genocide charges against al-Bashir. In a potential breakthrough, Chad and Sudan agree to normalise ties. Additionally, a ceasefire agreement is reached between JEM and the government.

Note- Delegates must note that the Darfur conflict was one event in the turbulent history of Sudan that further gave rise to future struggles and destruction which caused tensions to rise and sparked more clashes within the country and externally. The explanation and the timeline provided shall suffice in gaining a fundamental understanding of the agenda, however the delegates are expected to connect the same to the series of events that occurred post 2010, which could be seen as products of the aftermath of the 2010 conflict





Current Scenario

In the months after the 2021 coup the already weak Sudanese economy steeply declined, fueling wide protests demanding that the junta relinquish power back to civilian authorities.

Tensions arose between the two junta leaders over al-Burhan's restoration to office of old-guard Islamist officials who had dominated the Omar al-Bashir government. Hemedti saw the appointment of these officials as a signal that al-Burhan was attempting to maintain the dominance of Khartoum's traditional elite over Sudanese politics. This was a danger to the RSF's political position, as said elites were hostile to Hemedti due to his ethnic background as a Darfuri Arab. Hemedti's expression of regret over the October 2021 coup signals a widening divide between him and al-Burhan.

Tensions between the RSF and the SAF began to escalate in February 2023, as the RSF began to recruit members across Sudan. Throughout February and early March the military built up in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum, until a deal was brokered on 11 March and the RSF withdrew. As part of this deal negotiations were conducted between the SAF, RSF, and civilian leaders, yet these were delayed and halted by political disagreements. Chief among the disputes was the integration of the RSF into the military: the RSF insisted on a 10-year timetable for its integration into the regular army, while the army demanded integration within two years. Other contested issues included the status given to RSF officers in the future hierarchy, and whether RSF forces should be under the command of the army chief rather than Sudan's commander-in-chief, al-Burhan.

On 11 April 2023, RSF forces were deployed near the city of Merowe as well as in Khartoum. Government forces ordered them to leave, and were refused. This led to clashes when RSF forces took control of the Soba military base south of Khartoum. On 13 April, RSF forces began their mobilisation, raising fears of a potential rebellion against the junta. The SAF declared the mobilisation illegal.



Bloc Positions

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/SLA)

They initiated its resistance against the Khartoum government in February 2003, operating from the Jebel Marra Mountains in Darfur. Composed mainly of individuals from the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribes, these rebels, who have increasingly identified as ethnically African, were motivated by years of neglect from the Khartoum government. The lack of essential infrastructure such as roads, schools, and hospitals in Darfur, coupled with inadequate representation in regional government positions, fueled their discontent. Despite their appeals to be included in peace negotiations between Khartoum and southern Sudan, they were disregarded. In April 2003, the SLA launched a significant surprise attack on the airport in Darfur's capital, resulting in the destruction of military aircraft, casualties among soldiers, and the capture of a Sudanese air force general. The SLA continued its offensive against Khartoum government installations in Darfur until September 2003 when a ceasefire was agreed upon, albeit short-lived due to violations by both parties. Subsequent ceasefires negotiated in 2004 met a similar fate.

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

They emerged in early 2003 from a coalition of well-educated, seasoned Darfurians with political experience. Many of these JEM founders were former members of the Popular Congress Party (PCP), the brainchild of Hassan al-Turabi, the architect of Sudan's Islamic revolution. Initially, JEM's leadership and membership originated largely within the Kobe, a Zaghawa sub-sect more numerous in Chad than in Darfur. Since 2007, JEM has embarked on a vigorous campaign to enlist Darfurian Arabs, even those affiliated with government-supported militias or 'janjaweed'.

From its inception, JEM has relentlessly pursued sweeping national reforms and the toppling of the incumbent regime. To delegitimize the administration internationally, JEM strategically exploited the egregious human rights violations perpetrated in Darfur. The movement's refusal to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006 underscored its commitment to its goals. Two years later, JEM garnered renewed support in Darfur following a daring raid on Khartoum's twin city, Omdurman. Despite this, expansion of its base, JEM's true political and belligerent capabilities remain firmly entrenched within the Kobe Zaghawa inner sanctum.



Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM)

The LJM was created in February 2010 as a negotiating umbrella for two coalitions formed at international urging—the Libyan-backed Sudan Liberation Revolutionary Forces also known as the Tripoli Group and the Addis Ababa Group that is identified with US Special Envoy to Sudan Gen. Scott Gration. The LJM has no unified military command and its component parts are relatively insignificant militarily. Tijani Sese, a member of the Fur tribe whose involvement satisfies the mediation's urgent desire for Fur representation in Doha, leads the LJM.

Omar Al-Bashir

In August 2003, rebel groups from the black African community in Darfur initiated an attack on Bashir's government, citing unfair treatment. In order to suppress the uprising in Darfur, the president sought assistance from the Janjaweed, an Arab militia notorious for their brutal tactics that instilled fear among the local population. Their actions not only hindered the delivery of essential food and medical supplies by international aid organisations but also resulted in the displacement of over two million people. Consequently, Bashir faced severe criticism from international observers. Despite the ongoing conflict in Darfur, the president reluctantly agreed to the deployment of a limited AU peacekeeping force. However, he resisted the UN efforts to send a larger international force.

On July 14, 2008, the chief prosecutor of the ICC requested an arrest warrant to be issued against Bashir. He was accused of committing crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide in Darfur. The Sudanese government, not being a party to the ICC treaty, refuted the allegations and declared Bashir's innocence. Subsequently, on March 4, 2009, the ICC granted an arrest warrant for Bashir, marking the first time the ICC pursued the arrest of a sitting head of state. The charges included war crimes and crimes against humanity, but not genocide. In July 2010, a second arrest warrant was issued by the ICC, this time accusing Bashir of genocide. The ICC arrest warrants for Bashir gained attention once more in December 2014, when the ICC prosecutor announced the suspension of the investigation due to the United Nations Security Council's failure to compel Bashir to appear in court.



Janjaweed

When the two main rebel factions, the JEM and SLA staged a joint raid on a Sudanese airbase, delivering a significant blow to the government, the weakened Sudanese military turned to the Arab militias, unified as the Janjaweed, for counterinsurgency. Empowered by Sudanese military intelligence with advanced weaponry and communication tools, the highly mobile Janjaweed forces drastically altered the course of the conflict. They inflicted heavy losses on the rebels and embarked on a systematic campaign, described by international observers as ethnic cleansing, targeting the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnicities. Janjaweed tactics were horrifyingly brutal. Sudanese air force bombardments paved the way for mounted Janjaweed attacks, characterized by massacres, mutilations, mass rape, and the abduction of children. Villages were systematically razed, with fields burned, wells poisoned, and any valuables seized. This relentless onslaught, spanning 2003 to 2008, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the displacement of millions across Darfur.

The Janjaweed's actions were widely condemned by the international community, with then-US Secretary of State Colin Powell labeling it genocide. Despite denials of any involvement by the Sudanese government under President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the international outcry led to the deployment of an African Union peacekeeping force in 2004. However, their limited numbers proved insufficient to effectively deter the Janjaweed. Only with the bolstering of the AU force by a UN peacekeeping contingent in 2008, reaching a combined strength of over 22,000, were the Janjaweed's activities in Darfur curbed.

Janjaweed

In the wake of high-level discussions held in Addis Ababa in 2006, the international community rallied to address the escalating conflict in Darfur. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) spearheaded efforts to bolster the existing African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Through intensive diplomatic manoeuvres by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and various international actors,



Sudan finally consented to the deployment of a groundbreaking joint peacekeeping force in June 2007. On July 31st, 2007, the UN Security Council formally established this joint mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This unprecedented collaboration, authorised by resolution 1769, aimed to bring stability to war-torn Darfur. UNAMID officially assumed its duties on December 31st, 2007, succeeding AMIS. With headquarters established in El Fasher, North Darfur, UNAMID extended its reach through sector headquarters in all five Darfur states: El Geneina (West Darfur), Nyala (South Darfur), Zalingei (Central Darfur), and El Daein (East Darfur). These strategically located deployments allowed UNAMID to maintain a robust presence across the region.

National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD)

Emerging from the fissures within the JEM in 2004, they arose as a consequence of ideological discord. The JEM's perceived overemphasis on political objectives, to the detriment of the social and economic well-being of the people, spurred the NMRD's formation. Initially garnering support along the Sudan-Chad border, the NMRD sought to address the multifaceted grievances of the population.

A fleeting moment of conciliation arrived in December 2004, with the signing of two agreements between the NMRD and the Sudanese government. These pacts, brokered under the eyes of humanitarian organisations, aimed to facilitate humanitarian access to war-torn regions and establish security protocols. The agreements further envisioned the release of prisoners of war and the voluntary return of displaced persons and refugees. However, the NMRD's military capacity remained limited, and by 2005, hostilities resumed. Despite its numerical disadvantage, the NMRD re-engaged in armed conflict with the government. A glimmer of hope flickered in July 2005, as representatives from both sides convened in Al Fasher under the auspices of the United Nations and African Union. This monitored meeting offered a potential avenue for renewed cooperation. Yet, fragile peace prospects shattered in January 2006. The NMRD launched a surprise attack on a Sudanese military base in Arm Yakui, inflicting significant casualties. This act of aggression, originating from Chadian territory according to Sudanese claims, reignited the flames of violence in war-ravaged Darfur.



Sudan's People's Liberation Army (SPLA)

The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is the army of the Republic of South Sudan. The SPLA was founded as a guerrilla movement in 1983 and was a key protagonist of the Second Sudanese Civil War. Throughout the war, it was led by John Garang de Mabior. Following John Garang's death, Salva Kiir Mayardit was named the new Commander-in-Chief of SPLA. As of 2013, the SPLA was estimated to have 210,000 soldiers and an unknown number of personnel in the small South Sudan Air Force. The SPLA is divided into divisions of 10,000-14,000 soldiers. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has been fighting a succession of Khartoum governments since 1983. Though its stated goal is to build a unified "new Sudan," it is widely perceived as representing the interests of the south, where most of its fighting is done and which it now almost entirely controls. After more than eight years of remarkable cohesiveness, the SPLA witnessed its first serious coup attempt on August 28, 1991. Since it posed no immediate threat to the rule of SPLA commander-in-chief John Garang, in conventional terms the coup was a failure. But it raised issues of crucial importance to the SPLA, to Sudan, and to all liberational and nationalist movements, issues which are rarely acknowledged and even more rarely tackled.

Republic of Chad

Idriss Déby, CHad's president and a Zaghawa himself, was initially seen as a suitable mediator due to his ethnic kinship with many rebels, his intimate understanding of Darfur, and his historical leverage. However, his impartiality has been consistently challenged. Despite initial cooperation with the SLA in September 2002, Déby pledged military support to Omar al-Bashir to quell the rebellion in February 2003. Official troop deployments masked a potentially larger contingent, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG). Further blurring the lines, Chad contributed helicopters and vehicles to the joint Sudanese offensive, as confirmed by Sudanese officials.

When the ceasefire extension with the SLA was on the table, Déby's deportation of Darfurians intellectuals advising the rebels further eroded trust in his neutrality (ICG report). This action hindered the rebels' ability to negotiate effectively. A subsequent agreement with Khartoum established a joint task force to control cross-border activities, supposedly including the extradition of armed groups from Chad. However, the porous 1,350-kilometre border allowed both rebel incursions and militia attacks on refugees in Chad. Déby's perceived bias led rebel groups to demand international observers as a pre-condition for future talks. Scepticism extended to the Sudanese government itself, with human rights officials like Dobian Assingar highlighting their lack of faith in Chad's mediation efforts.



Federal Republic of Nigeria

Nigeria's prominent role in Darfur transcended mere mediation. It not only spearheaded diplomatic efforts but also provided a significant troop contribution to the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). However, the depth of Nigeria's commitment necessitates an examination of its national interests in this protracted conflict. Nigeria's primary national interest lies in state security and the pursuit of regional stability. The Darfur crisis posed a potential security threat due to the risk of its violent spillover into neighbouring countries, ultimately reaching Nigeria's borders. This concern stemmed from reported incidents- Chadian accusations of Janjaweed militia incursions targeting Chadian villages and Darfur refugees; rebel attacks in Chad's capital, N'Djamena, aimed at toppling Idriss Déby's government, potentially with Sudanese backing; conversely, accusations by Sudan of Chad's support for Darfur rebel groups, including potential integration into the Chadian military.

Another critical national interest for Nigeria involved managing potential refugee flows stemming from the conflict. With an estimated 2 million Darfurians displaced, over 200,000 seeking refuge in Chad, and the prospect of further displacement due to ongoing attacks, Nigeria's status as Africa's largest economy made it a likely future destination. This concern was amplified by the presence of existing Chadian refugees in northeastern Nigeria. While Nigeria's troop contribution to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS- UNAMID's predecessor) underscores its commitment to peace, a critical analysis based on "facts and data on ground" suggests a need for a more robust response. The ineffectiveness of the peace agreement and the Sudanese government's alleged role in exacerbating the humanitarian crisis point towards this necessity.

United Nations Security Council

For over a year, the UNSC prioritised the north-south Sudanese peace talks in Naivasha, Kenya, potentially due to misplaced optimism or fear of jeopardising those talks by addressing Darfur. Even in June 2004, when a UN mission to Sudan was established, Darfur received minimal attention. The UNSC's sole action until late July 2004 was a presidential statement urging the Sudanese government to disarm the Janjaweed militias, following reports of human rights abuses. Resolutions 1556 and 1564 included demands for disarmament, investigations, and a potential expansion of the African Union monitoring force. However, these measures remained largely focused on persuasion and investigation.

In November 2004, the Security Council, prioritising the north-south peace agreement, watered down its stance on Darfur in Resolution 1574. This resolution omitted specific criticisms of the Sudanese government and replaced potential sanctions with a vague threat of "appropriate action" in the future.

United States of America

During 2001-2002, the Bush administration prioritised ending the Sudanese civil war as a key foreign policy objective in Africa. Many observers believed this decision was influenced by pressure from conservative religious activists who had long criticised Khartoum's Islamist government for its human rights violations in the non-Muslim south. When conflict erupted in Darfur, Washington hesitated to condemn Khartoum for fear of jeopardising the North-South peace process.

However, on April 7, 2004, President Bush denounced the "atrocities" in Sudan following calls for sanctions from a bipartisan group of U.S. Congressmen. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Darfur later that summer and confirmed in 2004 that genocide had been committed by the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed militia. The Bush administration's involvement in the Iraq war without U.N. approval influenced how other member states responded to the Darfur crisis, especially after the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. Khartoum exploited this situation by framing U.S. accusations as part of a broader anti-Islam and anti-Arab agenda. The most troubling aspect of U.S. policy towards Darfur was the inconsistency between Powell's genocide finding and the administration's decision to revert to a softer approach in November 2004, aiming to encourage Khartoum to sign the Naivasha accords. This shift, along with other factors, led to the Security Council's failure to address ongoing human rights violations in Darfur.





QARMA (Questions a Resolution Must Answer)

- What can the United Nations Security Council do to prevent a spillover of the Darfur Conflict into Neighboring States?
- How can the Security Council address the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants?
- What TCBMs can the Security Council use to promote stability in the Darfur region?



Recommended Readings

<https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/a-new-coup-era-for-africa/>

<https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-evolution-of-coups-in-africa>

<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/the-un-security-council-handbook-by-scr-1.pdf>

<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/>

https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm

<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/sudan.php>

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2023.2269693>

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1. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) - Darfur Humanitarian Update, December 2023;
2. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) - Refugee and Displacement Report, November 2023;
3. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) - Crisis Report on Darfur, 2023;
4. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) - Humanitarian Impact Assessment, October 2023. 5. African Union (AU) - Peace and Security Council Briefing, September 2023;



Further Assistance

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